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SUNMARY
This paper points out the conceptual distinction between the rates
of decay in the physical productivity of traditional capital goods and
that of the appropriate revenues accruing to knowledge—producing activities,
and notes that it is the latter parameter which is required in any study
which constructs a stock of privately marketable knowledge. The rate of
obsolescence of knowledge is estimated from a simple patent renewal and
the estimates are found to be comparable to evidence provided by firms
on the lifespan of the output of their R&D activities. These estimates,
together with mean R&D gestation lags, are then used to correct previous
estimates of the private excess rate of return to investment in research.
We find that after the correction, the private excess rate of return to
investment in research, at least in the early 1960's, was close to zero,
which may explain why firms reduced the fraction of their resources
allocated to research over the subsequent decade.
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Therecent interest of economists in knowledge-producing activities
has had two main strands. The first is an attempt to explain the growth in
themeasured productivity of traditional factors of production by incor-
porating research resources in production function and social accounting
frameworks; (for a review see Griliches, 1973, and idem,forthcoming)
The second derives from two fundamental characteristics of knowledge as
aneconomic commodity, its low or zero cost of reproduction and the diffi-
culty of excluding others from its use. These features give knowledge the
character of a public good and suggest that the structure of market incen-
tives may not elicit the socially desirable level (or pattern) of research
and development expenditures. In particular, it has been argued that mar-
ket incentives may create an underinvestment in knowledge—producing activi-
ties (see Arrow, 1962, for a discussion) .Inorder to investigate this
possibility, economists have applied the techniques of productivity analysis
and estimated the private (and social) rate of return to research frompro-
duction functions incorporating research resources as a factor of production.
The estimates of the private return for the late 1950's and early 1960's
fall in the range of 30—45 percent.1 Despite these high estimated private
rates of return, the share of industrial resources allocated to research
expenditures declined steadily over the succeeding decade.2 This suggests
1For example, see Griliches (forthcoming) and Mansfield (1965).Note that
both these studies are based on firmormicro data. More aggregative data
bases are not directly relevant to estimates of the private rate of return
to research.
2
The share of net sales of manufacturing firms devoted to R&D has declined
from 0.046 in 1963 to 0.029 in 1974, or by about 40 percent. See NSF
(1976, Table B—36)—2—
a paradox: why has research effort been receiving less attention from
industrial firms if the private rate of return to research is so attractive?
o important parameters in these calculations of theprivatereturn
to research are the rate of decay of the private revenues accruing to in-
dustrially-produced knowledge and the mean lag between the deployment of
research resources and the beginning of that stream of revenues. These
parameters, of course, are necessary ingredients in any study which involves
a measurement of the stock of privately marketable knowledge. The rate of
decay in the returns from research has not previously been estimated. In
this paper we present a method of explicitly estimating that parameter.
We also use information provided by others to calculate the approximate
mean R &Dgestation lags. Since previous research has not included the
latter and seems to have seriously understated the rate of decay of appro—
priable revenues in calculations of the private rate of return to research
expenditures, we then use our estimates to improve on previous results on
this rate of return.
Of course, all previous work in this area has been forced to make some
assumption, either implicit or explicit, about the value of the decay rate.
The problem arises because it has been assumed to be similar to the rate of
decay in the physical productivity of traditional capital goods. The fact
that the rate of deterioration of traditional capital and the rate of decay
in appropriable revenues from knowledge arise from two different sets of
circumstances seems to have been ignored..3
The employment of research resources by a private firm produces new
knowledge, with some gestation lag. The new knowledge or innovation may be
31t is common to find an assumed rate of decay of the knowledge produced by
firms of between 0.04 and 0.07 (Mansfield, 1965). Griliches (forthcoming
1978) noting some of the conceptual distinctions between the rates of decay
in traditional capital and in research, assumes an upper bound of 0.10 for
the latter.—3—
a cost—reducing process, a product, or some combination of the two. The
knowledge—producing firm earns a return either through net revenues from
the sale of its own output embodying the new knowledge, or by license and
non—monetary returns collected from other firms which lease the innovation.
Since the private rate of return to research depends on the present value
of the revenues which accrue to the sale of the knowledge produced, the
conceptually appropriate rate of depreciation is the rate at which the
appropriable revenues decline for the innovating firm. However, as Boulding
(1966) noted, knowledge, unlike traditional capital, does not obey the laws
of (physical) conservation. The rate of decay in the revenues accruing to
the producer of the innovation derives not from any decay in the produc-
tivity of knowledge but rather from two related points regarding its market
valuation, namely, that it is difficult to maintain the ability to appro-
priate the benefits from knowledge and that new innovations are developed
which partly or entirely displace the original innovation. Indeed, the
very use of the new knowledge in any productive way will tend to spread and
reveal it to other economic agents, as will the mobility of scientific
personnel. One might expect then that the rate of decay of appropriable
revenues would be quite high, and certainly considerably greater than the
rate of deterioration in the physical productivity of traditional capital.3a
In Section I we examine two independent pieces of evidence bearing on
the rate of decay of appropriable revenues. Next, the information from var-
ious sources on the mean lag between R&D expenditures and the beginning of the
3aItshould be noted that the models used in this paper do not assume that
the rate of decay in appropriable revenues is exogenous to the firm's
decision—makingprocess. In adynamic context, a firm possessing an inno-
vation has to choose between increasing present revenues and inducing
entry, and charging smaller royalties in order to forestall entry. This
choice is the basis of Gaskin's (1971) dynamic limit pricing analysis of—4—
associated revenue stream is summarized. In Section IIIwe attempt to gct a
rough idea of how seriously the existing estimates of theprivate rate of
return to research overstate the true private rate ofreturn. Brief concluding
remarks follow.
3.1. The Rate of Decay of Appropriable Revenues
The first piece of evidence on the rate ofdecay in appropriable revenues
(hereafter,the rate of decay) is based on datapresented in Federico (1958).
Federico provides observations on thepercentage of patents of various ages
which were renewed by payment of mandatoryannual renewal fees during the period
1930-39 in the United Kingdom, Germany,France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
A theoretical model of patent renewal will leaddirectly to a procedure for
estimating the rate of decay from these data.
Consider a patented innovation whose annual renewalrequires payment of a
stipulated fee. Letting r(t) and c(t) denote theappropriahie revenues and the
renewal fee in year t, the discounted value ofnet revenues accruing to the
innovation over its lifespan, V(T),is
(1) V(T) =I[r(t) -c(t)]e_tdt,
where i is the discount rate and 1' is theexpiration date of the patent.
Differentiating (1) with respect to I, the optimumexpiration date, T*, is
written implicitly as
(2) r(T*) =c(T*)
provided that r'(t) <c'(t)for all t.Equivalently,the condition for renewal
of the patent in year t is that theannual revenue at least covers the cost of
thereilc'waI fec'
(5) r( t c(t).
;iLui t. Ionsinvolvingtemporary monopoly power. Gaskin 's model can beused to sl'iow that the Optimal revenue streamwill decline over time and that therate oF (1('CIIflewilldepend on certain appropriabilityparameters.—5—
Let the annual renewl fee grow at the rateg, and let the 8ppropriarle rev:aucs
decline at rate .Thencondition (3) can be written as
(4) r(O) >
Partition6 intoan econony average rate of decay(*jida patent specific
deviationfromthat average andlet f(r) denote the relative dens itfunction
of initial appropriable revenies adjusted for differences inthe decay rate among








(ob) P' '(t)=-f(C)C"(t)ri +C
where the primes denote derivatives. That is, aslong as (g +6)>0,the
percentage of patents renewed will decline with their age. The curvature of
P(t), however, will depend on the distribution of the values of the innovations
'4
patented.In particular, if £(r) is lognormal, P(t) will have nepoint of
inflection, being concave before it and convex thereafter (scecurve I, Figure la).
'4Sincethe value of patents [equation (1)]is a monotonic transformationof













Alternatively, Scherer (1965) cites evidence presented in Sanders and others
(1958) which indicates that the value of patents tends to distribute Pareto-Levy.
If f(r) is strictly declining (e.g. Pareto-Levy), P(t) will be a stricfly
decreasing, convex function of patent age, as shown by curve 2. Figure lb
presents the actual time paths of P(t) from Federico (1958). Four of the five
curves tend to support Sander's data and are consistent with an underlying
Pareto-Levy distribution of patent values. The time path for Germany, however,
indicates that the underlying distribution for that country has at least one
mode. Since it is futile to estimate both the parameters of the underlying
lognornial (for example) and the decay rate in appropriable revenues from only 18
observations available on Germany, we shall disregard the German data in the
remainder of the empirical work.
We now use this simplified model to obtain rough estimates of the decay
rate of appropriable revenues .Consistentwith the evidence in Figure ib,
the relative density function of initial revenue is taken to be of the Pareto-
Levy type:
(7) f(r) = rm >O•>0
where r is the minimum value of r in the population. Then the percentage of
patents which are renewed in year t can be expressed as
(8) P(t) =[r/c(0)]e*)t—8—
There are two error terms differentiating the observedvalue of the lugarithm
5
of Plog J', from the value predictedby equation (8).The first, v1, is a
sampling or measurement error while the second, v
,isa structural error in
2
the model. Assuming that P is derived froma binomial sampling process around





where N is the (unobserved) number of patents sampled. The structural error,
v ,willbe assumed to be an independent, indentically distributed normal deviate
2
2 withvariance o.
Letting j index a country, for sufficiently large N the logarithmic transform
of can be written as
ti
(9) log P. =a.+a .t. +





Consistent estimates of a0., ajjandtheir standard errors can be derived
from the following two-stage procedure. First estimate (9) by ordinary least





LettingF be the fitted value from (10), use F to weight, and perform
weighted least squares on (9).
is bounded by zero and unity. As a result, the composite error cannot be
independently and identically distributed. The analysis which follows
corresponds closely to the treatment of similar problems in logit
regressions. See Berkson (1953) and Amemiya and Nold (1975)—9—
If our model iscorrect, andif 6 andcS* do notvarybetween countries, icn
(1l a. .66* -6g..
6 Since g., the rate of growth ofrenewal fees, is available fromFederico's data,
(11) can he tested by using F4 to
weight and performing weighted leastsquares
on the equtio.-
(12) log .5*• -6(g.t.)
where all symbols are as definedabove.
If (11) is the truespecification, then ..2 times the logarithm ofthe likelihood
ratio from (12) and the weighted
least-squares version of (9) will distribute
asymptotically as a X deviate. Moreover,equation (12) will provide estimates
of both the rate of decay of
appropriable revenues (6*), and theunderlying
distribution of patent values(8).
6
These growth rates were calculated froma semi-log linear regression of costs
against time for each country. Thegrowth rates (and their standard errors)
for the Netherlands, the Unitedkingdom, France, and Switzerland were
0.085 (.0.002), 0.129 (0.015), 0.089(0.006) and 0.143 (0.008).—10—
































a/ The data on patent renewal are taken from Federico (1958). These datacover
the percentage of patents of different ages in force during 1930-39 whichwere
renewed by payment of a mandatory annual renewal fee. Forexample, if a patent
was granted in 1925, it would appear in the data as 5 years old in 1930, 6years
old in 1931, and so on. Therefore, the percentage ofpatents renewed after5 years
is based on the total number of patents issued 5years earlier in a particular
Country.
b/ Small numerals are standard errors.
c/ *=
d/The confidence interval corresponds to the 95per cent Fieller bounds
(n *.—11—
Table 1 summarizes the empirical results. The observed value of the
test statistic is 5.4, while the five percent critical value is 5.99. Though
a little high, the test statistic does indicate acceptance of the hypothesis
in (11). The estimates of l/N and a2 are all positive thereby lending
support to the weighting procedure described above.
Turningto the parameters of interest, the point estimate of 8was0.57
with a standard error of 0.07. One can check this estimate against an inde-
pendent source of information. As mentioned earlier, Sanders et. al.(1958)
provideevidence on the distribution of the value of patents in the United
States. Fitting a Pareto—Levydistributionto these data, we obtain a point
estimate for of 0.63 with a standard error of 0.06. That is,the estimate
offrom Sanders' data is very close to that obtained using our model and
Federico's data.7
Ourprimary interest is in 5*,the(average) decay rate in appropriable
revenues.The point estimate ofis0.25, while a 95 percent confidence
interval places the true value of S*between0.18 and 0.36.8 An estimated
7These data correspond to appropriable revenues minuscostsassociated with
the patent, but since cost data were not available we were forced to use
net-value data. A cumulative Pareto—Levy distribution was fitted to the
fivepositive net—value observations on expired patents which therefore
have observable net values. The R2 from thisregressionwas 0.97. Note
that Pareto-Levy distributions with 8<1do not have either a finite mean
or variance and hence do not behave according to the law of large numbers.
Therefore, if the distribution of patent values approximates the distribu-
tion of project values, diversification into many independent projects will
not reduce risk. This point was originally made by Nordhaus (1969). Of
course, if the returns to different projects are negatively correlated,
diversification may still reduce risk.
8
Notethatsince the estimate of &' is obtained as the ratio of twocoeffi-
cients, its confidence interval (obtained by using Fieller bounds) is not
symmetric around itspointestimate. Three remarks on the robusthess of
these results arealsoin order. First, the assumption that the revenue
streamcanbe described by an exponential rate of decay can be viewed as
a first—order (logarithmic) approximation to a more general streamof—12—
6*of0.25, though consistent with theoretical arguments concerning the
unique characteristics of knowledge as an economic commodity, implies that
earlier researchers have assumed values of 6* which are far too small. In
particular, the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for 6* is
nearly twice the maximum value of the rate of decay of private returns used
in previous research.
There is, of course, the possibility of sample selection bias in our
estimate of 5*.Therate of decay of patented innovations may differ from
that of all innovations. The direction of the bias is indeterminate since
it depends on the correlation between the patent selection process and the
rates of obsolescence in the universe of all innovations. However, there
are two reasons to believe that the estimates of 6*maybe biased downwards.
First, the fact that patents create property rights in the embodied know-
ledge may result in a lower rate of obsolescence for those innovations which
can be patented. Second, given an innovation which can be patented, it is
easy to show that the innovator will actually take out a patent only if
patenting thwers the rate of decay. As we show presently, however, evidence
revenue. We also experimented with a second-order approximation, namely,
r(t) =r(O)eAt+Bt.Theestimates of B and its standard error were both
zero to two places of decimals, and the rest of the results were almost
identical to those reported here. Apparently, market—induced obsolescence
is well approximated by an exponential pattern. Griliches (1963) reaches
the same conclusion with respect to the obsolescence component of the
deterioration in the value of traditional capital goods. Second, the results
from the unweighted regressions were similar to the ones reported above.
The unweighted version of (12) yielded a point estimate of 6*0.22,with
Fieller bounds of 0.16 to 0.33, and an estimate of =0.62.
Finally, we can use the unconstrained version of the estimating equa-
tion to provide six different estimates of the combination W,6*).The
constrained version, in effect weights the various estimates in an optimal
manner. Five of these unconstrained estimates were (0.63, 0.22), (0.49,
0.32), (0.55, 0.26), (0.65, 0.21), and (0.47, 0.34). The sixth is obtained
from comparing the estimates of and g. from France and the Netherlands.
However, since =g,to two decimal places this comparison contains almost
no new information and therefore receives almost no weight in the constrained
regression.—13—
of a completely different nature tends to show that whatever bias exists
is negligible.
The second source of evidence on the magnitude of thedecay rate of
appropriable revenues is derived from data presented in Wagner (1968)on the
lifespan of applied research and development expenditures.Survey data on
applied research arid development were collected from about 35 firms withlong
RD experience in 33 product fields, using theproduct field description
employed by the NSF in its annual industry reports. Included in thesurvey
was a question on the lifespan of RD, defined as the period after which
the product of the RD was "virtually obsolete."
This definition does not correspond directly to the decline in the
appropriable revenues accruing to research and development. However,a rough
correspondence can be established by assing that RD is virtually obsolete
when the appropriable revenues reach some small fraction of the initial value, anu
then experiment with different fractions to examine the sensitivity of the
implieddecay rate to the assumption. Table 2 presents theaverage lifespan
ofR &Dfor durable and non-durable product field categories, product and
process—orientedR &D,and the implied decay rates based on various reasonable
definitions ofvirtualobsolescence. Whilethe implied decay rates do vary
withthe definition of virtual obsolescence, therangeof values is nearly
identicalto the Fieller bounds on ó inTable i.
Theresponses of firms to Wagner's question can also be used to check
the reasonablenessof the rates of obsolescence commonly assumed in the
9The only other estimate of thedecayrate inproducedknowledge of which we
are aware is reported in a footnote in Griliches (forthcoming). A regression
ofproductivity growth against R &D flowand stock intensity variablesin
his micro data set yielded an estimated 6' of 0.31. Griliches points out
thediscrepancy between this result andthe restofhis analysis but offers
noreconciliation.—14—
Table 2. Estimates of 6* from Average Lifespan of R &
Ratio of revenue in year T
to initial revenue (x) (i.e.,
'virtual obsolescence') o.is 0.10 0.05
b/ * Revenuedecay rate— (6 ) Durable-goodsR D
Product IT=9) 0.21 0.26 0.33
Process CT =11) 0.17 0.21 0.27
Nondurable-goods RD
Product (T =9) 0.21 0.26 0.33
Process CT =8) 0.24 0.29 0.38
a/ Taken from Wagner (1968,P. 196, Table 5), which refers to 'applied research and
development'(ARD). These lifespan figures (in parentheses)are averages of
survey responses, weighted by 1965 product-fieldexpenditures and by frequencies
of the response distribution.
b/ Calculated as 6* =-(logx)/T.—15—
literature. If in fact 6* =.05(.10), that would imply (using T =9from
Table 2) that firms consider the product of their R & D virtually obsolete
even though the annual revenue flow is still 64 (41) percent of its initial
value.
3.2. Mean R & D Lags
Two independent sources of informationare used to estimate the meanR D lag,
defined as the average time betweenthe outlay of an RD dollar and the
beginning of the associated revenue
stream. This lag consists of amean lag
between project inception and
completion (the gestation lag), and the time
from project completion tocommercial application (theapplication lag).
Rapoport (1971) presents detailed dataon the distribution of Costs and
time for 49 commercialized
innovations and the total innovatkontime for a
subset of 16 of-them in threeproduct groups -chemicals,machinery, and
electronics. The innovationprocess isdecomposed into five stages:applied
research,specification, prototype or pilotplant, tooling and manufacturing
facilities,and manufacturingandmarketing start-up. Since the expenditures
onmanufacturing andmarketing start-up are not included in theNSFdefinition
ofRD expenditures, the time involved in that stage is treated hereas the
applicationlag. Th remainingdata areused to calculate the gestation lag.
Thefirst part ofTable 3 suiarizes the R D gestation and application lags
forthe three product groups.0
10Thedetails of all calculations are omitted here for the sake of brevity
but are available upon request. However, the limitations of these esti-
mates should be noted. First, all the projects analyzed by Rapoport
resulted in significant innovations, and as Scherer (1965) and Mansfield
(l96have noted, mean lags tend to be longer for more significant
technical advances. Second, we have not taken into account the time—16—
Table3. Estimates of the Mean R & D Lag (6)
RD gestation lag Application lag Total lag
Rapoport
Chemicals 1.48 0.24 1.72
Machinery 2.09 0.31 2.40
Electronics 0.82 0.35 1.17
Wagner
Durables 1.15 1.47 2.62
Nondurables 1.14 1.03
Source: Calculated from data contained in Rapoport (1971) and Wagner (1968).—17—
Additional information on the average RD and application lags is
provided in Wagner (1968). Survey data on process and product oriented RD
were gathered from about 36 finns with long RD experience in a variety of
durable and nndurable goods industries. Included was informationon the
duration of applied research anddevelopment,project duration for projects
successfully completed in 1966, the distribution of RD expenditures for
successfully completed projects classified by project duration, thepercentage
of total funds accounted for by projects abandoned beforecompletion, together
with the time of abandonment, and the interval between thecompletion of RD
andcommercialapplication of the innovations. These data are used to calculate
both an application lag and a meangestationlag which, unlike those based on
Rapoport's data, take into account expenditures on both technically successful
andunsuccessfulprojects. The results are given in the second part of Table 3.
The gestationlags based onWagner'sdata are broadly similar to those
deriyed from Rapoport but the application lags are considerably longer,11
causing some discrepancy between the two sets of results. Mansfield (1968),
using data gathered from extensive personal interviews with RD project
overlapbetween stages which, according to Rapoport, is considerable. Both
of these factors would tend to cause upward biases inour estimates of 0. On the other hand, the R &Dcosts of technically unsuccessful projects
should be taken into account, which would tend to raise the estimates of0. 11
SinceWagner does not precisely define the "end of AR&D"orthe "application ofinnovations," some caution should be exercised in interpreting theappli-
cation lags. Wagner does indicate that the longerapplication interval in
durablesreflects in large part the defense—space—atomic-energy oriented fields, so that theapplication lag for other industries is probably closer
tothe nondurables estimate. On the other hand, Rapoport's'manufacturing and marketing start-up' stage may understate the actualapplication lag.—18—
evaluation staff, concluded that the meanapplication lag was about 0.53 years.
Substitution of this number for Wagner's wouldbring the two sets of results
closer together and put the total lag at about 1,75years. For present
purposes, however, a range of values somewhere between 1.2 and 2.5years is
good enough.12
3.3.Implications for Measuring the Private Rate of Return to Investment
in Research
Thepreceding sections of this paper provided estimates of thedecay rate and
the mean RD lag whose values are substantially higher than thoseassumed
in previous research. These estimatesare now used to get a rough indication
of the implicatjons for production function estimatesof the private rate of
return to research expenditures,
Let denote the increment in value added (or sales)generated by a unit
increase in research resources 0years earlier. Then the equation for the
private (internal) rate of return to investment in research is
12
It is interesting to note thatthe maximum of thisrange is considerably
shorter than the midpoint ofthe interval between projectinception and
marketing, reflecting the fact that thedistribution of research
expenditures on projects isconsiderably skewed to the left.—19—
(13) 1 =1QRe
0
where 8 and t5weredefined earlier and r is the private rate of return, or
the implicit discount rate that would make investment in research marginally
profitable. In the special case where 0 =0,(13) reduces to r -, which
corresponds to the equation used by previous researchers. In general, however,
the private rate of return is found by solving the following equation for r
(14) r -QR)0
+ o.
Two points should be noted here. First, since research expenditures
are already included in the measures of traditional capital and labor
expenditures in the production functions used to estimate R' the calculated
private rate of return to research represents an excess return above and
beyond the normal remuneration to traditional factors (see Griliches, 1973).
That is, r may be interpreted as the risk premium attached to research
activity. Second, the estimates of obtained by other researchers are
calculated by multiplying the estimated sales (value-added) elasticity of
the stock of knowledge tines the ratio of sales to the stock of knowledge.
The stock of knowledge is taken as the undepreciated s.un of research
expenditures over the period of observation; For the calculations in (14)
to be consistent, however, the stock of knowledge must be calculated
according to declining-balance depreciation. We therefore calculate the
depreciated sum of research expenditures with a decay rate of and then
use this stock of knowledge to convert the estimated sales elasticity into—20—
a value of This has been done for the three values of ,corresponding
to the point estimate and FieJier bounds obtained earlier (0.18, 0.25, and
0.36), and for three different values 'Q (0.25,0.30, and 0.35). The
results are presented in Table 4 for values of 8 equal to 1.75 and 2.0.
13 We thank Zvi Griliches forpointing out this problem and suggesting a
solution. The data for the calculations are taken from NSF (1976,
Table B-i). Three additional points should be noted. First, Griliches'
aggregate gross excess rate of return estimate was about 0.30, while
his estimates for research intensive and non-research intensiveindustries
were 0.40 and 0.20 respectively. Mansfield's estimates (averagedover
the ten firms he used) range from about 0.20 to 0.30depending on the
specific assumptions made. Since Griliches' data are far more
comprehensive, we based the calculation of the conversion factor
on them. Second, if private returns to knowledge do in factdecay,
there is an error in the measured stock of knowledge usedas an
independent variable in Griliches' regression. However, it can be
shown that the ratio of the variance in measurement error to the
variance in the true stock is less than 0.0026, which cansafely be
ignored. That is, the sales elasticity of the stock of knowledgecan
be taken directly from Griliches' regression.Finally, the private
rates of return are much less sensitive to changes in 8 than to different
values of *.—21—




0.18 0.053 0.085 0.114
0.25 0.015 0.047 0.081
0.36 -0.051 -0.015 0.021
——
0.18 0.043 0.073 0.100
0.25 0.004 0.033 0.065
0.36 -0.067 -0.032 0.000—22—..
Turning to the results, it is apparent that the measured private (net.
excess) rates of return to investment in research are greatly reduced byour
adjustments.For example, Griliches (forthcoming) reports a gross excess
return of 0.30 which, after correction for an assumed decay rate of 0.10,
translates into a net excess rate of return of 0.20. By contrast, Table 4
indicates that the rate of return associated with =0.30,evaluated at
our point estimate of ,isbetween 0.033 and 0.047. Inviewof the
abnormal riskiness associated with research expenditures, these risk premia
would appear to be modest.
in short, Table 4 suggests that the private rates of return to investment
in research and traditional capital are roughly equated at the margin. Another
way of checking this possibility is to ask: what is the decay rate of
appropriable revenues implied by the assumption that firms equate, at the margin,
the private rates of return to investment in research and traditional capital?
With a mean R F4 D lag of 6, the return to a dollar of research is (r1*+l)(l÷r)0,
while for traditional capital, with depreciation rateitis (r +* +
Using =0.06and r =0.08from Griliches (forthcoming) ,thevalue of
which equates these two terms is &k= 0.22if 01.75 and 6 0.25 if 0 =2.0.
These values are nearly identical to the point estimate ofin Table 1.
3.4. Concluding Remarks
Inthis paper we stress the conceptual distinction between the rates
of decay in the physical productivity of traditional capital goods and that
of the appropriable revenues which accrue to knowledge-producing activities.
An estimate of the private rate of obsolescence of knowledge is necessary—23—
inany study which requires constructing a stock of privately marketable
knowledge. We estimate this parameter from a simple patent renewal model
andfind the estimate comparable to evidence provided by firms on the
lifespan of the output of their R &Dactivities. The empirical results
indicate that the rate of obsolescence is considerably greater than the
rates typically assumed in the literature. The estimated decay rates,
together with mean R &Dgestation lags, are used to calculate the private
excess rate of return to investment in research. Our results suggest that
the private rate of return to research expenditures, at least in the
early 1960's, wasnotunreasonably high. It is important to emphasize,
however,that in order tocome to conclusions regarding the divergence
between the private and social rates of return to knowledge—producing
activities, information on the social rate of return must be added to the
information contained in this paper." Nonetheless, if our calculations of
theprivate excess rate ofreturn are even approximately correct, they do
suggest a partial resolution to the paradox presented in the introduction
to this chapter: why did private firms steadily reduce the share of
their resources devotedto R &D iftheir previous research effort was so
highlyprofitable? Part of the answer maybe that research was not as pri-
vately profitable as has been thought.
1k
Inthis connection, itshould be noted that the social rate of decay
maywell be smaller than the rate ofdecay of appropriable revenues.
SeeHirshleifer's (1971)distinctionbetween real and distributive effectsin the production of knowledge.—24—
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